《保险研究》20211104-《公益林保险投保主体道德风险形成机理与防范机制研究》（秦涛、吴静黎、孙晓敏）

［摘   要］我国公益林保险发展迅速,但投保主体的道德风险问题严重影响了公益林保险市场的经营效率。本文阐述了公益林投保主体道德风险的表现形式,在部分补贴和全额补贴模式下，具体表现为经营主体因有风险保障而诱发的冒险和不积极的防灾减损,或人为破坏和变相融资行为,以及地方林业部门与保险公司合谋套取中央财政保费补贴资金,或以防灾减损费、协办费形式返还,滥用防灾减损资金等。进一步地，本文通过效用函数和贝叶斯博弈模型分析了林农和地方林业部门作为投保主体时道德风险的形成机理。研究发现:当前公益林保险投保主体道德风险主要是由于补贴机制、投保模式、保险产品设计和定损理赔方式等制度因素不合理造成。建议明确地方政府在公益林保险中的主体责任,实行林业部门统保统赔方式,优化保险产品和费率动态调整机制,建立“灾前预防+灾后赔偿”的补偿机制。

［关键词］公益林保险；道德风险；投保主体；形成机理；防范对策

［基金项目］本文受到教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“我国森林保险精准扶贫效应评估与机制优化研究”(编号:20YJA790059)、北京市社会科学基金项目“北京市公益林保险产品创新与运行模式优化”(编号:18YJB011)和国家社科基金后期资助项目“中国森林保险需求与供给模式研究”(编号:20FGLB022)的资助。

［作者简介］秦涛,北京林业大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:林业金融与森林保险；吴静黎,北京大学汇丰商学院硕士研究生,研究方向:国际经济与发展经济；孙晓敏,北京林业大学经济管理学院硕士研究生,研究方向:林业金融与森林保险。

A Research on the Formation Mechanism and Countermeasures of the Applicant’s Moral Hazard in Non-commercial Forest Insurance

QIN Tao,WU Jing-li,SUN Xiao-min

Abstract：Non-commercial forest insurance has seen rapid development in China,but the moral hazard of insurance applicants has seriously affected the operation efficiency of the non-commercial forest insurance market.First,we systematically expounded on the behaviors of moral hazard in non-commercial forest insurance,and analyzed the formation mechanism of moral hazard through utility function and Bayesian game model when forest farmers and local forestry departments were the insurance applicants.We find that the moral hazards under the partial and full subsidy are manifested as risky behaviors and inactivedisaster prevention and loss reduction,or artificial sabotage and disguised financing,as well as the local forestry department colluding with insurance companies to obtain the central government subsidy funds or misappropriating disaster prevention funds through rebating in the form of disaster prevention and loss reduction funds and cooperative funds.Currently,the moral hazard in the non-commercial forest insurance market is mainly caused by the unreasonable subsidy and insurance application mechanism,insurance product design,loss determination and compensation.Therefore,we should explicitly specify the role of principal of the local government in the non-commercial insurance,plan on the insurance application and loss compensation as a whole by the forestry department,innovate on forest insurance products and the dynamic rating mechanism,and establish the "pre-disaster prevention & post-disaster compensation" mechanism.

Key words：non-commercial forest insurance;moral hazard;formation mechanism;insurance applicant;preventive measures