《保险研究》20220201-《保险公司关联交易监管：核心问题及优化路径》（宋明、王国军）

［摘   要］关联交易和公司治理的长期失控是造成近年来少数保险公司风险集中爆发的主要原因。虽然“从严防范、严厉打击”的思想已经非常明确，但如何识别出不当关联交易并予以精准打击仍是现实困境。本文从控制权及其私有收益的相关理论出发，分析保险业不当关联交易问题产生的根源，给出了保险业关联交易问题的逻辑推导及其控制权解释，提出私利行为的抑制疏导是关联交易监管的关键。进一步地，本文分析了保险公司关联交易的核心问题——险资运用，总结了险资运用关联交易的特点、危害及其监管的困难所在。基于理论和实践带来的相关启示，本文提出加强关联交易监管相关建议，一方面推动公司治理监管向控制权为中心发展迭代，建立个性化制衡手段，改良独立董事制度，校准关联审查机构定位等；另一方面推动关联交易监管向行为约束为核心转变，建立险资运用导向的监管规则，建立公允审查机制，扩充司法救济的发起机制等。

［关键词］关联交易；险资运用；控制权；公司治理

［作者简介］宋明，同济大学法学院博士研究生，中国银行保险监督管理委员会公司治理部；王国军，对外经济贸易大学教授，博士生导师。

Supervision of Related Party Transactions of Insurance Companies:Core Issues and Optimization Paths

SONG Ming,WANG Guo-jun

Abstract：The chronic loss of control of related party transactions and corporate governance entails concentrated outbreak of risks in a few insurance companies in recent years.Although the idea of "strict prevention and severe crackdown" has been made clear,the identification of and targeted crackdown on improper related party transactions remains a dilemma in practice.With relevant corporate control theories and its private benefits as a starting point,the paper analyzed the root cause of improper related party transactions in the insurance industry,offered the logical deduction of related-party transaction problems in the industry and its interpretation of control rights,and proposed that the restriction and channeling of private interests was essential for the regulation of related party transactions.It analyzed the core problems and supervision dilemmas of related party transactions of insurance companies,especially the characteristics,harms and supervision of related  party transactions in insurance companies′ use of insurance funds,and pointed out that the use of insurance funds was the core issue of supervision of related party transactions.Based on the relevant enlightenments brought by theories and practices,the paper put forward relevant suggestions for strengthening the supervision of related party transactions.On the one hand,corporate governance supervision should evolve towards the supervision of control rights,with customized “checks and balances” established,the independent director system improved,and related party review institutions properly positioned.On the other hand,related party transaction supervision should transit towards behavioral constraints,with supervision rules oriented to the use of insurance funds and a fair review mechanism established,and the initiation mechanism for judicial relief expanded.

Key words：related party transactions;use of insurance funds;control rights;corporate governance