《保险研究》20250208-《保险中介监管框架的重构：从二分法到三分法》（邹星光）

［摘   要］“保险代理人与保险经纪人分别代表保险人与投保人的利益”是一个被域内外保险法确立的、但极具误导性的二分框架。保险代理人与保险经纪人的主要收入来源都是保险公司端支付的佣金，本质上都属于卖方中介，保险经纪人提供的服务也是由卖方端驱动的，故无法真正地代表投保人的最大利益，从而也就与二分框架的区分逻辑存在明显矛盾。面对二分框架的悖论及投保人面临的利益冲突风险，在原监管框架下试图通过法律变革将保险经纪人改造为真正代表投保人最大利益的买方中介不具有可行性，即收费模式的强制转型(佣金禁令)或行为标准层面确立信义义务都不能有效提升对投保人利益的保护，甚至可能适得其反。保险公司付费型保险代理人与经纪人都是市场所需要的销售中介类型，但亦有部分具有更强支付能力的投保人需要更专业、利益冲突风险水平更低的投保建议服务。因此，监管法层面的合理应对方案是重构保险中介的监管框架，破除对保险经纪人角色定位的误解。首先，对于传统的保险代理人与经纪人这两类卖方中介，行为标准层面都应明确定性为适当性义务，且应禁止保险经纪人向个人投保人直接收取费用，从而凸显其卖方中介的角色定位。其次，应增设保险顾问这一买方中介牌照，在行为标准上明确其对投保人负有的信义义务或客户最佳利益义务，并禁止其向保险公司或其他中介收受佣金。

［关键词］保险中介;保险代理人;保险经纪人;保险顾问;佣金;信义义务

［作者简介］邹星光，清华大学法学院助理研究员，研究方向：商法、金融。

Restructuring the Regulatory Framework for Insurance Intermediaries:From Dichotomy to Trichotomy

ZOU Xing-guang

Abstract：The dichotomous framework that “insurance agents represent the interests of insurers,while insurance brokers represent the interests of policyholders” is a well-established yet highly misleading doctrine in both domestic and international insurance law.The primary source of income for both insurance agents and brokers comes from commissions paid by insurers,making them essentially seller-side intermediaries.The services provided by insurance brokers are also driven by the seller-side,which prevents them from truly representing the best interests of policyholders.This creates a clear conflict with the rationale underlying the dichotomous framework.In light of the dichotomous paradox and the risk of conflicts of interest faced by the policyholders,attempts to transform insurance brokers into true buyer-side intermediaries who represent the policyholder’s best interests through legal reforms within the current regulatory framework have proven to be infeasible.Mandating a shift in the payment model (i.e.,a commission ban) or imposing fiduciary duties on behavior standards cannot effectively enhance the protection of policyholders’ interests and may even backfire.Both insurance agents and brokers,who are compensated by insurers,serve as necessary sales intermediaries in the market.However,some policyholders with greater financial capacity require more professional advisory services that carry lower conflict-of-interest risks.Therefore,the appropriate regulatory response would be to restructure the regulatory framework for insurance intermediaries and eliminate misconceptions about the role of insurance brokers.Firstly,for traditional insurance agents and brokers,both types of seller-side intermediaries should be subject to suitability obligations,and brokers should be prohibited from directly charging retail policyholders brokerage fees,thus highlighting its role as the seller-sider intermediary.Secondly,a buyer-side intermediary license for insurance advisers should be introduced,where fiduciary duties or best interest obligations towards policyholders are clearly specified,and they should be prohibited from receiving commissions from insurers or other intermediaries.

Key words：insurance intermediary;insurance agent;insurance broker;insurance adviser;commissions;fiduciary duty