《保险研究》20190704-《农险市场中的保险公司道德风险研究》（柴智慧、赵元凤）

［摘   要］在过往十余年我国农业保险的跨越式发展中,保险公司的道德风险问题日益凸显。本文通过微观案例界定保险公司道德风险的内涵与类别,基于博弈视角分析其产生机理,结果发现：在政府和保险公司的委托代理关系中,由于二者的目标诉求不同,若政府对保险公司的农业保险业务不能给予有效监管,则保险公司不遵守经营规范所得收益要大于其遵守经营规范所得收益,从而导致保险公司出现违规经营业务的道德风险问题；相关部门可以通过完善监管政策、整合监管资源、优化协办机制、加大监管力度、设置差异化保险合约等措施来减少农业保险市场中保险公司的道德风险。

［关键词］农业保险；保险公司；道德风险

［基金项目］本文为国家自然科学基金(71873072、71503141和71363042)、内蒙古自治区高等学校“青年科技英才计划”(NJYT-19-B10)和内蒙古农业大学人文社科重点研究课题(XSK201601)的阶段性研究成果。

［作者简介］柴智慧,内蒙古农业大学经济管理学院副教授,研究方向：农业保险,E-mail：nmndczh@imau.edu.cn；赵元凤(通讯作者),内蒙古农业大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向：农业保险、农业信息化。

A Study on the Moral Hazard of Insurance Companies in Agricultural Insurance Market

CHAI Zhi-hui,ZHAO Yuan-feng

Abstract：Agricultural insurance in China has realized leap-forward development in the last decade or so,but moral hazard of insurance companies has also come to be highlighted increasingly. This paper defined the connotation and classification of the insurers’moral hazard by micro cases,and analyzed its formation mechanism based on the game perspective. The results show that because of different objectives of government and insurance companies in their principal-agent relationship,if the government cannot exert effective business supervision on insurance companies,the insurance company benefits more from non-compliance with operational norms than from compliance,which may lead to moral hazards of the insurance company. Therefore,related governments can perfect the regulation policy,integrate regulatory resources,optimize co-operation mechanism,strengthen supervision,and design differentiated insurance contracts to reduce moral hazard of insurance companies.

Key words：agricultural insurance; insurance company; moral hazard