《保险研究》20240106-《祸兮福兮？监管处罚对保险公司业绩表现的影响——基于分支机构视角》（卢雨萱、赵桂芹）

［摘   要］本文基于手工整理的保险公司分支机构的行政处罚数据，研究了监管处罚对财产保险公司的业绩表现是否以及如何产生影响。研究表明，监管处罚发挥了直接威慑效应，抑制了违规分支机构的业绩增长，且这种威慑效应是短期的。此外，监管处罚还发挥了间接威慑作用，降低了与违规分支机构同属一家公司的其他分支机构的业绩表现，但对同一地区下其他公司的分支机构无显著影响。区分公司业务类型、股权性质、监管处罚类型和公司所处地区后发现，监管处罚的直接威慑效应存在异质性。进一步地，佣金激励、营销员规模和信任水平会弱化监管处罚对业绩表现的抑制作用。本研究验证了行政处罚的有效性，为监管机构健全和完善保险监管制度、深化属地监管改革提供了经验证据。

［关键词］监管处罚；业绩表现；威慑效应

［基金项目］国家自然科学基金项目(71973089)：基于大数据的我国航运保险定价与风险管理研究。

［作者简介］卢雨萱，上海财经大学金融学院博士研究生；赵桂芹，上海财经大学金融学院副教授，研究方向：风险管理与保险。

Blessing or Misfortune? Regulatory Penalties and Insurers′ Performance—From the Perspective of Company Branches

LU Yu-xuan，ZHAO Gui-qin

Abstract：Administrative penalty has been one of the important means of regulation in China′s insurance industry in recent years.However，there is a lack of research on the economic consequences of such regulatory penalties in the academic area.Based on the manually-collected administrative penalties data for the branches of insurance companies，this paper studies whether and how regulatory penalty affect the performance of property insurance companies.The findings indicate that regulatory penalties have a direct deterrent effect，though the effect exists in the short term.The robustness testing has verified the above conclusion.It also play an indirect deterrent effect，lowering the performance of other branches of the same company，but the effect on branches of other insurers in the same region is not obvious.After distinguishing the type of business，the nature of shareholding，the type of regulatory penalty and the region of the company，it is found that the direct deterrent effect of regulatory penalty is heterogeneous.Moreover，commission incentive，size of agent force and level of trust can alleviate the inhibitory effect of regulatory penalties on insurer branch′s performance.The paper verifies the effectiveness of the regulatory penalty，and offers empirical evidences for improving on regulatory policies and for reform of differentiated policies for different regions.

Key words：regulatory penalties;premium growth;deterrent effect