《保险研究》20250407-《居民疫苗接种意愿与保险机制：疫苗异常反应补偿机制的经济学研究》（毛羽、陈泽、陈秉正）

［摘   要］为了应对居民疫苗接种的异常反应风险，我国建立了相应的保险补偿机制，并于2019年通过《中华人民共和国疫苗管理法》，在法律层面明确了其重要性。尽管经济学文献广泛探讨了居民疫苗接种的决策与均衡，但鲜有研究从保险补偿的视角进行经济学框架下的博弈分析。在我国逐步完善疫苗保险体系的背景下，本文将居民的非理性行为纳入流行病经济学模型，分析均衡接种率水平，并探讨疫苗保险补偿机制的作用。研究发现，居民对疫苗异常反应风险的主观认知偏差显著抑制了接种意愿，但保险机制能够有效纠正因高估疫苗异常反应风险而导致的决策偏差，进而提升接种率。本文还通过敏感性分析，系统研究了认知扭曲程度、疫苗表现，以及疫苗异常反应补偿保险的设计要素对疫苗决策行为及保险机制激励效应的具体影响。本文从决策博弈的视角促进对疫苗异常反应补偿保险机制作用的理解，为我国进一步完善现有疫苗异常反应补偿机制提供理论参考。

［关键词］流行病风险；疫苗异常反应补偿保险机制；疫苗决策；流行病经济学

［基金项目］对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助（24QD03）

［作者简介］毛羽，对外经济贸易大学保险学院讲师；陈泽，中国人民大学财政金融学院副教授；陈秉正，清华大学经济管理学院金融系教授。

Vaccination Willingness and Insurance Mechanisms：An Economic Study of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Insurance Mechanism

MAO Yu，CHEN Ze，CHEN Bing-zheng

Abstract：To address the risk of vaccine injuries among residents，China established the Vaccine Injury Compensation Insurance Mechanism，and legally specified its importance through the Vaccine Administration Law of the People′s Republic of China in 2019.While economic literature extensively discusses residents′ vaccination decisions and equilibria，few studies have conducted game-theoretic analyses from the perspective of insurance compensation.Against the backdrop of China′s gradually improving vaccine injury compensation insurance system，this paper integrates residents′ irrational behaviors into an epidemiological economic model to analyze equilibrium vaccination rates and explore the role of the vaccine injury compensation insurance system.The study finds that residents′ subjective cognitive biases regarding the risk of vaccine injuries significantly reduce their willingness to vaccinate.However，insurance mechanisms can effectively correct decision-making biases stemming from overestimating these risks，thereby increasing vaccination rates.Furthermore，the paper systematically examines the impacts of cognitive distortion levels，vaccine performance，and design elements of the vaccine injury compensation insurance system on vaccination decisions，along with the incentive effects of insurance mechanisms through sensitivity analyses.From a decision-making game perspective，this paper enhances the understanding of the role of the vaccine injury compensation insurance system and provides a theoretical foundation for further improving China′s existing vaccine injury compensation insurance system.

Key words：epidemic risk;vaccine injury compensation insurance system;vaccination decision;epidemic economics